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Abstract 
Facility Siting is an important phase of project development. A critical stage is plot plan 
optimisation, where significant potential hazards are eliminated due to equipment spacing. In 
addition to ensuring appropriate compliance with minimum spacing requirements, occupied 
building studies to achieve compliance with the requirements of API 752 and API 753 could also 
be undertaken to optimise safety outcomes. The studies are done in three stages, where the first 
stage is hazard identification, second stage is consequence assessment and the third stage is risk 
assessment. Third stage assessments are only carried, if the consequence based siting 
recommendations are not practical to implement.  
This paper presents the challenges in estimating risk due to process hazards with a focus on 
selecting right event likelihood data. A comparison is presented on the variation in predicted risk 
levels based on equipment failure rates and leak frequencies.  
Case study of a plot plan optimisation study is undertaken with DNVGL Phast Risk and the 
variation in risk levels up to two orders of magnitude are recorded. Challenges such as adaption 
of data for local conditions, consistent definitions of failure, sample size of data, applicability of 
data play a significant role in identifying and correctly quantifying the risk levels. Such 
challenges and its impact on risk quantification are presented in this paper as well as its impact 




Facility Siting is an important stage of layout design. Facility siting allows mitigation of 
consequences due to fire, toxic and explosion overpressures mainly by locating the equipment in 
a safe zone. In doing so, there is a structured process for identifying the hazards, estimating the 
consequences, mitigating the consequences and then where mitigation of consequences is not 
practical, the scenarios are subject to risk assessment. This is a typical process recommended in 
the Occupied Building Studies as per American Petroleum Institute (API) Recommended 
Practice 752[1]. The approach in the recommended practice could be utilised for plot plan 
optimisation.  
Facility siting studies can be applied at various project safety lifecycles. A green-field 
application yields a different outcome compared to a brownfield modification. In either phase of 
safety lifecycle, there is a clear distinction of understanding the hazards posed by process and in 
some cases there has been utilisation of this approach for emergency planning responses [2] to 
land use planning purposes [3].  
Marsh insurance, one of the largest insurers of major hazards facilities,  estimates that the total 
losses due to hydrocarbon releases since 1972 has exceeded in excess of USD10.6 billion 
[4].This includes incidences that are related to facility siting deficiencies.  
Facility siting incidences  
On 19th November 1984, a large Vapour Cloud Explosion at San Juan Ixhuatepec, Mexico City, 
PEMEX LPG terminal resulted in 650 fatalities and 6400 injuries [5]. Subsequent investigation 
concluded that there were multiple causal factors including proximity of community to the 
process areas, disabling of fire water protection due to overpressure post explosion and lack of 
isolatable segments for reducing the impact of fires. These factors are preventable, if there had 
been a due process of facility siting. 
Subsequent to the BP Texas City Incident that witnessed 15 fatalities and 170 injuries, a renewed 
focus on placement of occupied buildings followed. API RP 752 and 753 [6] was rigorously 
enforced worldwide and the Baker Panel report [7] was carefully studied to understand the full 
implications of hazards impacting occupied buildings. 
A lesser known explosion in an oxidisation unit of a petrochemical plant in Chesire UK in 1984 
had significant facility siting issues. The resultant fire impacted the fire water capabilities and 
disrupted critical services such as railways and waterways. The plant was rebuilt with increased 
plot area to mitigate consequential spacing risks to gain regulatory approvals [8]. 
Fukushima nuclear disaster followed from the earthquake and tsunami in 2011 highlighted some 
of the facility siting issues. The emergency diesel reactor failed upon demand, as it was flooded 
with water after the tsunami thereby leading to power loss with a potential for a core meltdown 
[9]. 
Historically, there have been many instances where adequate facility siting studies could have 





Engineering standard, recommended practices and frameworks 
Facility siting and minimum spacing requirements are specified in numerous documents with 
regulatory authorities worldwide. Some of the governing standards used in oil and gas 
installations are specified in Process Industry Practices, API  2510 [10] and in particular with 
API RPT 2510 A ,with a special reference to spacing of vessels, orientation of vessels post 
Mexico City event. A risk based approach is advised over and above the minimum mandated 
spacing requirement. There is often a misconception that minimum safety distances makes the 
layout inherently safe, however, this is not the case. The minimum spacing requirements could 
be met, however, there could still be risks of knock on effects and hence a risk based approach is 
recommended.  
API 752 and 753 take a more conservative approach. Though the primary intent is to ensure 
safety of personnel within an occupied building and to ensure that critical infrastructure is 
protected during emergencies, it is often applied to achieve safe separation and location of plant 
areas during the design phase of the layout. There is an ever growing focus on eliminating the 
location based risks at an early phase of project maturation.  
NFPA 59 A [11] in the LNG industry bears a good testimony of having an exclusive chapter on 
Facility Siting based on numerous events where Facility Siting aspects were found to be less than 
adequate.  
A general caution that applies in the context of spacing or facility siting is that there is no 
prescriptive way of designing. Facility siting challenges are unique to each project and 
engineering standards, recommended practices and legislated requirements are meant to serve 
minimum requirements, which must not be taken as an absolute value.  
Quantitative Risk Assessment and reliance on equipment failure databases  
Equipment failure could result in “loss of containment” of hydrocarbons, or simply be a “failure 
of functionality”. The initial origin of the equipment failure-frequency concept cannot be 
accurately determined. However, through published research it is most likely that the early 
equipment failure data was widely documented in the US nuclear industry dating back to the 
1960’s and early 1970’s [12]. General failure data was published by numerous sources, e.g. 
Philips and Warwick in 1969 and Smith and Warwick in 1974 [13]. Historical publications on 
equipment failure frequency data for onshore industrial applications can be traced back to 1978 
in a report titled “Canvey- an investigation of potential hazards from operations in the Canvey 
Island/Thurrock area” (commonly referred as the Canvey Island Report, 1978) [14]. Assessment 
of equipment failure frequency became the regular norm in QRA processes. A similar approach 
of publishing equipment failure frequency was adopted in The Netherlands with the release of 
the COVO report in 1982 (Rijnmond Public Authority, 1982) [15]. Following the Piper Alpha 
offshore platform disaster in 1988, Lord Cullen’s report paved the way for establishing a 
hydrocarbon leaks database from offshore installations, which is currently maintained by the 
Health and Safety Executive (UK) (Offshore Hydrocarbon Releases Statistics, 2002) [16].  In 
1994, the Dutch authority first published the standardised failure frequency document called the 
IPO initiative to be used for QRA purposes [17]. In 1999, the Dutch government published the 
Purple Book, which detailed equipment failure frequency based on the IPO report (RIVM, CPR 
18E, 1999) [18]. At the same time, consolidated efforts by leading petroleum companies paved 
the way for the Offshore Reliability Database, commonly known as OREDA, which was 
released in 1984 (OREDA 2009) [19]. OREDA has since then also been widely used for onshore 
applications. Regulatory reporting has played a significant role in deriving the equipment failure 
frequency which resulted in a loss of containment of fluids. There are numerous such databases 
maintained by various regulatory authorities, e.g. E&P forum maintains a very good pipeline 
failure database for European applications, while Department of Transport maintains a similar 
database for US pipelines. Industry representative bodies such as American Petroleum Institute 
(API), Centre for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), Institute of Chemical Engineers (IChemE), 
have published information on equipment data failure. Equipment manufacturers and suppliers 
have also maintained test result databases and these provide a performance measure for 
estimating equipment failure.  
A wide range of databases containing information on various equipment failure rates are 
available for public reference. The information has consistently been built up from previous 
studies, although in most cases the published data cannot be linked back to the source [20] [21]. 
This has resulted in reliance on the engineering judgement of the individual with far less 
understanding of the origin of the data. This factor has been recognised in some of the risk 
assessment software models.  
General issues surrounding equipment failure databases 
Equipment failure databases have different and specific intended applications [22]. The 
databases range from the nuclear industry, aviation/space industries, automotive industries, and 
numerous component manufacturers. For the purposes of this paper, databases that are generally 
referred to in the oil and gas industry for QRA purposes have been compared. Off-Shore 
Reliability Database (OREDA), TNO Purple book, United Kingdom Health and Safety (UK 
HSE) – Offshore Release Statistics and Centre for Chemical Process Safety/American Institute 
of Chemical Engineer’s (AIChE) – Process Equipment Reliability Database (PERD) have been 
compared (OGP Report number 434, 2010).  
Risk is the product of “likelihood” and “consequence”. Likelihood in the context of QRA largely 
refers to “equipment failure rates”. Theses failure rates, as a general observation, in many 
companies are obtained from the information in public domain databases.  
Databases available in public domain have differences in many areas. The following pitfalls 
should be avoided while choosing the equipment failure frequency for QRA purposes:  
Service condition of the failed equipment 
Plant equipment failure is largely governed by the process conditions during operation. Process 
conditions could be external or internal to the plant equipment. 
A pump may be in hot, cold or in cryogenic service conditions but the failure rate is given equal 
consideration while inputting into the QRA calculations. In another example, data analyses from 
relief valve failure indicated that the gas service failure rate was higher than the liquid service.  
Careful consideration should be given to the service conditions while selecting equipment failure 
rate, as this could alter the risk profiles.    
Data sample size for equipment failure data 
Sample size of equipment failures is an important indicator of the quality of data that is being 
used. Often the sample size of the data is overlooked. In certain instances, the database may only 
have reported the data; however, the sample size may not be significant to meet the reliability 
confidence levels. In such cases, it is always recommended to approach the equipment 
manufacturer or derive inference from the plant history. Industry experience and individual 
judgement also play an important role in making this decision. 
Definition of failure 
Failure definitions have varied between the databases. Failure in some cases has been in the 
context of hydrocarbon loss of containment and in others the loss of functionality. Databases 
have been driven by regulatory requirements, e.g. UK HSE, and others through voluntary 
reporting (CCPS and OREDA) as part of good industry practices. Both approaches have merits 
and drawbacks. As an example, a failed Critical Functionality Test during valve stroke testing 
may not necessarily lead to hydrocarbon loss of containment and hence definition of failure in 
this case could be “loss of functionality”. A conservative approach would be to carefully 
evaluate the failure definition in the context of the QRA application. 
Failure rate recorded duration 
Failure rate recording is done in many ways. Million hours of operations, annual frequency or 
variable hours of operations are some common ways of recording frequency of equipment 
failure. QRA input data has to be consistent in application to project consistent risk levels. A 
direct correlation through naturalisation of data to a common denominator may not necessarily 
be the correct approach in many cases. However, it is necessary that frequency is correctly 
reflected in the input data of the QRA model to give realistic risk estimation. Special attention 
should be paid while converting the scientific notational data to input data prior to commencing 
QRA modelling. 
Reporting purposes and context 
Reporting can be for regulatory purposes or on a voluntary basis. Regulatory reporting driven 
databases tend to focus on reporting hydrocarbon loss of containment with the intent of reducing 
harm to people, property or environment, whereas voluntarily shared data is focused on asset 
integrity and reliability. QRA data has to be specific to the context under which the study is 
commissioned. Many companies have over a period of time developed their own internal 
recording processes and such data represents more realistic risk assessment when applied to plant 
QRA. Transportability of equipment failure data between various industries and applications has 
to be carefully analysed and a general trap of using a fudge factor/ modification factors for 
localising the data should be avoided [23]. 
General comparisons between databases used in the oil and gas industry are presented in Table 1 
below. 
A case study of plot plan optimisation  
Project background:  
An expansion project was underway to double the production capacity on a fast track basis. The 
project involved connecting hundreds of wells through a gathering system, duplication of oil 
production trains with increasing capacities of three phase separators, heaters, pumps, 
compressors, oil storage tanks, power plant and a flare system upgrade. The project also intended 
to install a hydrogen sulphide extraction skid to cater to suspected changes in hydrocarbon 
stream compositions. The capacity addition was to tie in to an existing producing facility and 
hence had interfaces with the current plant design.  
Minimum separation between the equipment was in accordance with VNTP 3-85 [24] and VUPP 
88 [25].  In addition to meeting the minimum separations, there were concerns on spacing of 
equipment and hence the plot plan was subject to a three stage risk assessment taking the 
Occupied Building Study approach. 
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Study methodology  
The study methodology involved a three phase approach: 
Stage 1 – Hazard identification – identifying credible hazards  
In establishing credible hazard scenarios, a multi engineering discipline workshop was 
commissioned. Plant equipment location, inventory, stream compositions, process conditions, 
failure mechanisms, wind directions and consequence impact of fire, explosion and toxicity on 
adjacent installations were accounted in deriving credible hazardous scenarios. At this stage 
there was no credit taken for any controls and/or efficacy of controls in place. ‘What-If” analysis 
led to identification of multiple scenarios that could lead to major accident event. 
Stage 2 – Consequence assessment  
Credible hazard scenarios were then examined closely for process conditions, inventories and 
isolatable segments. 20mm and 100mm leak sizes were applied (with an exception to toxic 
release scenarios where more conservative hole sizes were modelled; however, this is not 
presented in the case study) for the consequence assessment using DNVGL Phast software. 
Consequences for fire and overpressure were determined. Underpinning consequence 
contributory factors like jet fire, pool fire, overpressure and toxicity were determined. The 
consequence acceptance criteria set by the company standards were used to establish safe 
separation distances and restricted areas. 
 
Stage 3 – Risk assessment  
The consequence approach on facility siting was adopted for the expansion project and those 
equipment that had difficulties in meeting the consequence based separation distances were then 
subject to the risk based separation distances approach. The risk based approach took into 
account equipment failure likelihood to establish safe separation distances.  
Case studies represented in this paper relate to the expansion project phase.  
Case study of first and second stage separators stacking versus horizontal separation 
arrangement 
Process description  
Fluid from inlet bulk fluid Heat Exchangers is routed to 1st stage separator. 1st stage separator 
operates at 5 barg pressure. 1st stage separator is a 3-phase separator from which the gas goes to 
compressor, water to produced water treatment and oil routed to 2nd stage separator. 2nd stage 
separator operates at an operating pressure of about 0.3 barg pressure. 2nd Stage Separator is 
also a 3-phase separator. Crude oil is stored in oil export tank. The process conditions of the 
separators are shown in Table 2 below. 
Table 2 – Process conditions of separators 
 
Figure 1, 2 and 3 represent the first vessel arrangements in stacking mode and in horizontal 
separation mode. In the stacking mode the modelling is done with a release height of 1m and 4 m 
from the ground level. In the case of horizontal separated arrangement a 15m separation is 
modelled from the edge of the vessel diameter.  
15m separation is based on Table 1 of NISTIR 6546, research report of the Building and Fire 
Research Laboratory. This research is on thermal radiations from large pool fires [26].   
In all cases 20 and 100 mm hole sizes were modelled for consequence estimates. Risk modelling 
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Figure1: Stacked arrangement – front view 
 




                         
 
 
Figure 3: Horizontal separation – front view 
 
Modelling methodology 
A two stage modelling methodology was introduced after identifying the worst case credible 
hazards. The first stage was consequence based modelling, where 20mm and 100mm leaks were 
modelled. Consequence based separations distances and its impact on spacing were also 
modelled.  
Subsequently, risk based modelling approach with equipment failure rates were modelled. 
During the risk based modelling, failure rates for different databases were used and the end risk 
levels were compared. Maintenance factors were introduced on risk levels to understand the 
variation in the risk levels. This approach is further explained in detail below. 
Consequence modelling was undertaken for 20mm and 100mm hole size distribution for stacked 
arrangement and separation type arrangement. Separation distances due to leaks of 20mm and 
100mm hole sizes were modelled based on heat radiation end point of 9.5 kw/m2, flammability 
end point (LFL) of 30697 ppm and 20970 ppm for 1st and 2nd stage separators,  respectively, and 
explosion end points of 0.14mbar and 0.2mbar. Safety distance was identified based on the 
consequence end point for a 20mm hole size and Restricted Access distance was identified based 
on consequence end point for 100mm hole size. The distances are shown in Table3 
An equipment failure rate was introduced to the first and second stage separator and the failure 
rates using different databases were compared. The risk levels are presented in Table 4 and Table 
5. The risk contours using different databases are represented in Figure 5. Maintenance factor of 
2 is also applied to look at the effect of the maintenance in reducing risks. Maintenance factors 
are indicators of maintenance carried out on the equipment.  This is represented in Table 6. Risk 
levels in isolation and when compared in context i.e. cumulative risk is presented in Table 7. 
Heat radiation effect on stacked vessel arrangements versus horizontally separated vessels at 
15m and 28m distances are represented in Table 8. The risk contours of stacked versus 
horizontally separated vessels are presented in Figure 6. 
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Table 3: Comparing separation distances for stacked vessel versus horizontally separated 
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Table 4: Risk levels of I stage separators – comparison using different equipment failure 
rates, [per year] 










Netherlands 2 OREDA3 Database 
Total per year  2.25E-02 2.65E-03 2.80E-04 1.12E-02 
Flanges 21 3.03E-03 NA NA NA 
Pipe process 100 6.57E-03 2.36E-03 6.00E-05 NA 
                                                 
1 The highest risk results for the weather stability of 2F and 5D 
2 Purple book, Netherlands do not have service type distribution.  
3 OREDA Database data used for process vessels and valves for failures types where it is defined as external leakage 
for process meduim. However it should be noted that OREDA databse does not provide information such as phase, 
hole size distribution.  
 
Small bore fittings 7 4.13E-03 NA NA NA 
Valve actuator  7 3.98E-03 NA NA 2.35E-03 
Valve manual 3 4.43E-04 NA NA NA 
Vessel process 2 4.31E-03 2.90E-04 2.20E-04 8.89E-03 
 
Table 5: Risk levels of II stage separators – comparison using different equipment failure 



















Total per year  1.49E-02 4.79E-04 2.39E-04 1.09E-02 
Flanges 19 2.54E-03 NA NA NA 
Pipe process 8 5.41E-04 1.89E-04 1.92E-05 NA 
Small bore fittings 6 3.54E-03 NA NA NA 
Valve actuator  6 3.50E-03 NA NA 2.02E-03 
Valve manual 3 4.43E-04 NA NA NA 
Vessel process 2 4.31E-03 2.90E-04 2.20E-04 8.89E-03 
 
 
Table 6: Risk levels using different databases 
Databases Leak frequencies of 
1st and 2nd stage 
separators, /year  
IR Integral using 
Maintenance Factor 
1  
IR Integral using 
Maintenance Factor 
2  
UK HSE 3.73E-02 1.13E-03 2.26E-03 
OREDA 2.22E-02 6.66E-04 1.33E-03 
Belgium  3.13E-03 2.23E-05 4.45E-05 
Purple Book 
(TNO)  





    UK            HCRD                                                     OREDA                                                             
    
 
Belgian Handbook of frequencies                             Purple book 
Figure 5: Risk contours with various databases  
Table 7: Risk value for standalone vessel versus cumulative risk (in context) 




Risk level in isolation (Process vessel only) 2.96E-04 2.93E-04 
Cumulative risk ( risk in context )  1.13E-03 1.12E-03 
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1. Stacked arrangement         2. Horizontal separation arrangement (28m apart) 
Figure 6: Stacked arrangement vs. Horizontal separation arrangement for 1st and 2nd stage 
separators LSIR contours
Case study 2: Natural Gas to Liquid (NGL) injection pump relocation  
Natural Gas to Liquid (NGL) under high compression is injected through a pump into the ground 
operating at 198bar gauge pressure. NGL due to its high pressure has a potential to fire, upon 
ignition.  
A consequence based approach of modelling the scenario using 20mm and 100mm loss of 
containment resulted in jet fire scenario of 280 m. A risk based approach resulted in a separation 
distance of 18m. The distances are represented in Table 9 below. 
In this instance, consequence based separation distance was opted, as it was practical and safe 
thing to do.  
 
Table 9: NGL pump consequence and risk based distances. 










20 mm 72.1 70.8 43.0 - 
100 mm 287.0 429.4 221.7 - 
1E-4 per 
year 
18 NR NR 20 
 
Results and discussions  
Facility Siting considerations need to be carefully evaluated as this could have enormous safety 
consequences in addition to commercial losses. In the case of stacked arrangement of separators, 
consequences due to fire and explosion were significantly higher compared to horizontally 
separated design. In this case, it could be clearly established that meeting minimum spacing 
standard of 15 m does not necessarily make a safe choice of separation. In this instance a 28m 
distance would render the separators safe. Risk based decisions need to be carefully selected, as 
it is reliant on the quality of equipment failure data. Failure rate influences risk results in the 
order of one to two magnitudes. This in real terms has commercial value associated due to 
increased plot plan areas. 
In the case of NGL pump relocation, plot plan was permissive of consequence based distances to 
be met. If in the event of plot plan constraints, this would have triggered risk based distances 
being applied, which would have seen emphasis placed on mitigating higher overpressures and 
heat radiation levels, thereby increasing in costs of engineering controls being put in place. 
Learnings 
Direct learnings: 
• Apply consequence based approach and then go with risk based decision making process 
demonstrating adequacy of controls and risk levels As Low As Reasonably Practicable 
(ALARP) 
• Use fit for purpose likelihood data of equipment failure and thoroughly understand the 
variation in risk levels. 
• Undertake sensitive studies with credible scenarios to derive at a realistic risk levels, 
failure of which could result in controls being directed in wrong areas with a possibility 
of cost escalations.  
• Use of maintenance factors or any localisation of data for equipment failure rates has to 
be adequately justified and its impact fully understood.  
Related learnings: 
• Risk from a scenario should be looked in context (cumulative risk) rather than in isolation 
or stand-alone mode.  
• Timing of the plot plan optimisation –facility siting studies derive best value at front end 
engineering design stage prior to freezing of plot plan. Sufficient time should be allowed 
for implementing recommendations of the facility siting studies 
• If the plant is in operational phase, emphasis on iterative models looking at reducing the 
inventories through isolatable segments, valve closure times for quick isolation, staggered 
blow down, and enhancements in engineering control can be derived through the results 
of facility siting studies. 
• Safety zones during normal operations and maintenance can also be established. This 
could include occupancy distribution studies, access during normal and emergency 
phases and placement of safety critical services like fire hydrants, flare lines and utilities. 
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